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Korea: An International Law Perspective 
By Andrew Wolman 
 
 
Abstract  
 
This essay poses the question of whether North Korean escapees have a right to enter and reside 
in South Korea under international law.  The answer to this question may seem obvious to 
those unfamiliar with inter-Korean relations.  Of course, all countries have the right to 
determine whether foreigners may gain entry to their countries; that is a fundamental attribute of 
sovereignty.  In the context of the Korean peninsula, however, the answer is not so simple.  
Under South Korean law, individuals born in North Korea are normally considered South 
Korean nationals, and under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
(arguably) customary international law, countries have a general duty to allow entry and 
residence to their own nationals.  The interesting question, then, is whether this general duty 
extends also to the specific circumstances of the Korean peninsula, when most North Koreans 
have relatively little connection to South Korea, despite their formal South Korean citizenship.  
After considering different aspects of the issue, this essay will conclude that South Korea does 
have a duty to accept North Korean escapees under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.  However, this duty is solely treaty-based, and customary international law 
does not currently impose any analogous requirements.  
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Ever since the drafting of its nationality laws in 1948, South Korea has considered 
individuals born in North Korea to be South Korean nationality.1  In general, this South 
                                                          
 Andrew Wolman received his J.D. from New York University School of Law and his LL.M. from 
George Washington Law School.  He currently works as an Assistant Professor at the Graduate School 
of International and Area Studies of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, in Seoul, Korea, where he 
teaches courses in human rights and international law.   
1 For the sake of readability, this essay will refer to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as ‘North 
Korea’ and the Republic of Korea as ‘South Korea’.    
Korean nationality has been more theoretical than practical.  After all, South Korean 
authorities have little to no ability to influence the lives of individuals in North Korea, 
regardless of nationality.  However, as more and more North Koreans have succeeded in 
escaping from their closed society, they are increasingly attempting to claim the natural fruit of 
their South Korean nationality: the right to enter and live in South Korea.   
 The number of such escapees was relatively small prior to the early nineties. 2  
However, in the wake of the devastating famine of 1995-1998, thousands of North Koreans left 
their country in search of food, and the number of escapees continues to be high, due in part to 
economic deprivation and in part to the brutal repression of the Kim Jong Il regime.  In 
October 2010, South Korea accepted its 20,000th North Korean escapee;3 a substantial figure, 
but still small in comparison to the number of North Korean escapees currently in China 
(estimates range from 10,000 to 300,000)4 or to the potential number of escapees that could 
result from a regime collapse or environmental catastrophe.   
 One of the most sensitive questions of Korean immigration policy has been how to 
treat these immigrants from the north.  Until the early nineties, North Korean escapees – or 
defectors, as they were then generally called – were greeted with open arms and generous 
financial subsidies.5  Over the last two decades, however, the increased volume of escapees 
and closer inter-Korean ties have sparked more of a debate as to whether it is good policy to 
always allow entry to North Koreans.  To many South Koreans, a welcoming policy is an 
important demonstration of the fundamental unity of the Korean peninsula, as well as a 
humanitarian necessity.  Others argue that despite their formal South Korean nationality, North 
Korean escapees should be admitted selectively to avoid social and economic disruption.6  
Some also fear that if South Korea truly welcomed all North Korean escapees, it would 
                                                          
2 Andrei Lankov, Bitter Taste of Paradise: North Korean Refugees in South Korea, in THE NORTH 
KOREAN REFUGEE CRISIS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 53, 54 (Stephan Haggard & 
Marcus Noland, eds., 2006). 
3 Lee Sun-Young, Number of Defectors to Top 20,000, KOR. HERALD, Oct. 6 2010. 
4 Rhoda Margesson et al., North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues: International 
Response and U.S. Policy Options, 4 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code 
RL34189, Sep. 26, 2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34189.pdf. 
5 Lankov, supra note 2, at 55. 
6 Id., at 66. 
destabilize the North Korean regime, and they fear the results of sudden regime collapse.7  
Some also object to classifying North Korean escapees as South Korean nationals because doing 
so may harm the escapees’ chances of receiving asylum in third countries.8  
The issue of North Korean escapees’ right of entry to South Korea is usually addressed 
through the framework of domestic law and policy.  This essay aims to take a step further, and 
examine the question of whether Korea has an international law duty to accept all North Korean 
escapees that wish to settle in the South.  The answer to this question is non-obvious.  While 
states clearly may exclude non-nationals,9 there is, in general, an international law obligation to 
allow entry to nationals: as one commentator noted, “[t]he duty to admit nationals is considered 
so important a consequence of nationality that it is almost equated with it."10 It is far less clear, 
however, whether this general obligation also applies to the situation of North Koreans seeking 
entry to South Korea.  In one recent case involving a refugee determination for North Korean 
escapees in the United Kingdom, the tribunal suggested without analysis that any South Korean 
refusal would be challenged as a violation of international law.11  This essay will argue that 
such a challenge would indeed be successful, and that denyin entry to North Korean escapees 
                                                          
7 Id., at 57. 
8 In Seop Chung et al., The Treatment of Stateless Persons and the Reduction of Statelessness: Policy 
Suggestions for the Republic of Korea, 13 KOREA REV. OF INT’L STUD. 7, 23 (2010).  This results from 
the definition of “refugee” in Art. 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which specifies that “in the 
case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term ‘the country of his nationality’ shall mean 
each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the 
protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has 
not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national”. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 Jul. 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, art. 1(A)(2). 
9 See, e..g, PAUL WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 (2d ed. 1979); 
Rosalyn Higgins, The Right in International Law of an Individual to Enter, Stay in, and Leave a Country, 
49 INT’L AFFAIRS 341, 344 (1973); HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 372-73 (2d ed. 
1966).   
10 HARO F. VAN PANHUYS, THE ROLE OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 56 (1959). 
11 KK and ors (Nationality: North Korea) Korea CG [2011] UKUT 92 (IAC) at para. 67 (stating  in the 
context of a discussion of North Korean escapees’ right to enter South Korea that “[i]f it were ever to be 
shown that a country had a general practice of not receiving its own nationals, there would be likely to be 
pressure through diplomatic channels, and perhaps litigation at the Hague”).  
would be considered a violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(‘ICCPR’). 
 The essay will be organized as follows.  Section II will provide background on the 
domestic legal framework for allowing entry to North Korean escapees, and an overview of 
current practices.  Section III will investigate whether the ICCPR requires the South Korean 
government to accept North Korean escapees.  Section IV will address whether customary 
international law duties exist.  Finally, section V will provide a brief conclusion.  This essay 
will not address possible arguments that South Korea (or indeed any country) has a duty to 
accept North Korean escapees under the Refugee Convention or Convention Against Torture, as 
these arguments are well developed elsewhere in the literature.12  Rather, it will concentrate on 
possible international law duties emanating from the escapees’ formal South Korean nationality. 
 
II. Background 
 
A. North Koreans and South Korean Nationality Law 
 
Under international law, the possible South Korean duty to accept North Korean 
escapees is entirely dependent on the fact that North Koreans are also considered South Korean 
nationals.  This is the case due to the combined actions of the 1948 South Korean 
Constitution13 and the South Korean Nationality Act from the same year.14  The Constitution 
states in article 3 that “[t]he territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean 
peninsula and its adjacent islands.”15  While the exact state boundaries cannot be inferred from 
such a brief statement, in general terms it is clear that Korean peninsula encompasses the 
                                                          
12 See, generally, Elim Chan & Andreas Schloenhardt, North Korean Refugees and International Refugee 
Law (2007) 19 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 215; Russell Aldrich, An Examination of China's Treatment of North 
Korean Asylum Seekers, 7 N. KOREAN REV. 36 (2011); Eric Yong-Joong Lee, National and International 
Legal Concerns regarding Recent North Korean Escapees, 13 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 142 (2001). 
13 Constitution of the Republic of Korea, adopted on 17 July 1948. 
14 Nationality Act (ROK), Law Number 16, 20 Dec. 1948 (‘Nationality Act’). 
15 Constitution of the Republic of Korea, supra n. 13, at art. 3. 
territory administered by both North and South Korea.16  The Constitution also speaks to 
nationality in article 2, which states simply that “[n]ationality in the Republic of Korea is 
prescribed by law.  It is the duty of the State to protect citizens abroad as prescribed by law.”17 
The prescription of nationality is implemented with the Nationality Act, which specifies 
that any person falling in one of the following categories ‘shall be a national of the Republic of 
Korea at birth’18: 
 
1. A person whose father or mother is a national of the Republic of Korea at the 
time of a person’s birth; 
2. A person whose father was a national of the Republic of Korea at the time of 
the father’s death, if the person’s father died before the person’s birth; 
3. A person who was born in the Republic of Korea, if both of the person’s 
parents are unknown or have no nationality.19 
 
Therefore, in principle, any North Korean would also be a South Korean national from birth, 
provided he or she is not descended from two foreign (i.e., non-North or South Korean) parents.  
This conclusion is widely (but not unanimously) accepted by Korean legal scholars.20  It has 
also been confirmed by the Korean Constitutional Court.21   
 There are, however, some circumstances in which it seems clear that North Korean 
escapees – despite being South Korean nationals from birth – will in fact be denied entry into 
                                                          
16 See Chang Hyo Sang, Nationality in Divided Countries: A Korean Perspective, in NATIONALITY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A KOREAN PERSPECTIVE 255, 257 (Ko Swan Sik ed., 1990) (citing Korea Supreme 
Court judgment 4292 of Sep. 28, 1961, Case of Administration Action No. 48). 
17 Id., at art. 2. 
18 Nationality Act, supra n. 14, at art. 2. 
19 Id. 
20 See, e.g., Chulwoo Lee, South Korea: The Transformation of Citizenship and the State-Nation Nexus,  
40 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 230, 232 (2010); Jeanyoung Lee, Ethnic Korean Migration in Northeast Asia, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR: HUMAN FLOWS ACROSS NATIONAL BORDERS IN NORTHEAST 
ASIA 118, 128 (2002); Chung et al., supra n. 8, at 22 (“the South Korean judiciary and the dominant 
scholarly opinion regard North Korean territory as a part of the territory of the Republic of Korea, and 
therefore all North Korean people as nationals of the Republic of Korea.”) 
21 Nationality Act Case, 12-2 KCCR 167, 97Hun-Ka12 [Kor. Const. Ct.] (31 Aug. 2000). 
South Korea, or at least denied the visa or passport that would allow them to board a plane or 
ferry bound for South Korea (overland migration is virtually impossible due to the highly 
fortified border with North Korea).  These denials can be broken down into three categories; 1) 
denials under the Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping from 
North Korea (“Protection Act”);22 2) denials of entry to North Korean escapees present in 
China, and 3) denials of entry to individuals outside of China whose eligibility has not been 
investigated under the Protection Act (or who have been investigated and do not fall into any of 
that Act’s categorical exclusions).  Each of these categories will be reviewed in turn. 
 
B. Protection Act Denials 
 
In 1993, the South Korean government passed the Protection Act, which, among other 
things, specifies which North Korean escapees qualify for “protection”.  While the South 
Korean government has been vague as to whether the Protection Act formally regulates entry 
into South Korea or solely other benefits such as resettlement assistance, as a matter of practice, 
it is fairly clear that the right of entry is in fact conditional upon receipt of “protection”.23 
 The Protection Act limits the ability of North Korean escapees to enter South Korea in 
three main ways.  First, it only applies to “residents escaping from North Korea”, a category 
which it defines quite vaguely as covering “persons who have their residence, lineal ascendants 
and descendants, spouses, workplaces and so on in North Korea, and who have not acquired any 
foreign nationality after escaping from North Korea”.24  This could disqualify from protection 
                                                          
22 Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping from North Korea (ROK), Law 
Number 6474, partial revision, 24 May 2001 (‘Protection Act’).   
23 See, Chung et al., supra n. 8, at 24. (“While ‘protection’ in principle refers to the package of 
resettlement benefits available to North Korean escapees settling in the South, in practice it seems clear 
that protection is interpreted as a much broader concept, covering various measures ranging from 
admission to a diplomatic mission and then to South Korea, to providing economic, social and 
educational benefits on Korean territory.”); Refugee Review Tribunal 1000331 [2010] RRTA 932 
[Australia] (25 October 2010), para. 56 (citing a report from Pillkyu Hwang stating that South Korean 
citizenship does not convey an automatic right to enter the country, and that the only legal avenue for a 
North Korean escapee to enter South Korea is by applying for ‘protection’). 
24 Protection Act, supra, n. 22, at art. 2(1). 
certain individuals who would be considered South Korean nationals under the terms of the 
Nationality Act.25   
 Second, pursuant to article 3 and article 7 of the Protection Act, the Act has been 
interpreted as applying only to individuals with a “will and desire” to reside in South Korea.26  
This interpretation has been confirmed by officials of the South Korean embassy in Canada27 
and representatives of the Ministry of Unification and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade.28  This restriction is probably most relevant in the context of individuals who are 
seeking asylum in third countries: in an official letter from 2010, the Korean Embassy to the 
United Kingdom specified that “[t]he first and most important criterion in the determination of 
offering protection and settlement support to North Koreans is to ascertain whether the person 
in question desires to live in the Republic of Korea. … As such, the protection of the 
Government of the Republic of Korea for North Koreans does not apply to those North Koreans 
who wish to seek asylum in a country other than the Republic of Korea.”29  
Third, and most importantly, article 9 of the Protection Act specifically rejects 
protection for the following persons: 
 
                                                          
25 There is anecdotal evidence of a few North Koreans present in South Korea who are caught in a legal 
limbo due to Chinese ancestry, however these individuals have to date been allowed to stay in South 
Korea. H. Cho, ‘Wonsungimando mothan…’ mugukjeok talbukjaui hansum’ [‘Less than a monkey…’ 
Sigh of a North Korean Defector who has no Nationality], NOCUT NEWS, 17 Apr. 2011, at 
<http://www.nocutnews.co.kr/show.asp?idx=1776839>.  See also, Chung, supra n. 8, at 26. 
26 Article 3 of the Protection Act states the Act “shall apply to residents escaping from North Korea who 
have expressed their intention to be protected by the Republic of Korea”, while article 7 provides that 
‘[a]ny person who has escaped from North Korea and desires to be protected under this Act, shall apply 
for protection to the head of an overseas diplomatic or consular mission, or the head of any administrative 
agency ...’ (italics added). Protection Act, supra, n. 22, at arts. 3; 7.   
27 See Kim v. Canada, 2010 FC 720, para. 15 [Canada] (30 June 2010) (citing a 2008 letter from the 
South Korean Embassy in Canada stating that North Koreans must demonstrate that they possess the 
“will and desire” to live in [South] Korea in order to be considered South Korean citizens). 
28 KK and ors, [2011] UKUT 92, at para. 35 (citing Choi Kang-sok from the Inter-Korean Policy 
Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Jo Jae-sop at the Ministry of Unification). 
29 Id., at para. 28. 
1. International criminal offenders involved in aircraft hijacking, drug 
trafficking, terrorism or genocide, etc. 
2. Offenders of non-political, serious crimes such as murder, etc.; 
3. Suspects of disguised escape; 
4. Persons who have for a considerable period earned their living in their 
respective countries of sojourn; and 
5. Such other persons as prescribed by the Presidential Decree as unfit for the 
designation as persons subject to protection.30 
 
There is an administrative procedure for determining qualification for protection under the 
Protection Act, with the Ministry of National Unification conducting investigations and 
determining eligibility for protection, unless national security might be affected, in which case 
the Korean National Intelligence Service makes the final decision.31  There is no appeal 
procedure available from outside the country.32 
Many scholars have noted that escapees covered by the article 9 exceptions will not be 
allowed entry into South Korea or treated as nationals in other respects.33  This has also been 
confirmed on occasion by South Korean government officials.34  Article 9(4) provides a 
potentially broad and significant ground for exclusion, given the fact that many North Korean 
escapees spend a period of time working in China prior to continuing to a third country and 
attempting to settle in Korea.  South Korean authorities appear in practice to have interpreted 
                                                          
30 Protection Act, supra n. 22, at art. 9.   
31 Chung et al., supra n. 8, at 24. 
32 While two alternate mechanisms for receiving a nationality determination are available once an 
individual is within Korea, these are of no use to those attempting to gain entry in the first place. Id., at 
24-5. 
33 C. Lee, supra n. 20, at 232; KK and ors, [2011] UKUT 92, at para. 34-35. 
34 For example, the South Korean embassy in Canada stated that some North Korean escapees are 
ineligible for South Korean citizenship, including ‘”bogus” defectors, persons who have resided in a third 
country for an extended period of time; and international criminals such as persons who have committed 
murder, aircraft hijacking, drug trafficking or terrorism.’ Kim v. Canada, 2010 FC 720, at para. 15. The 
relevant officer at the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade was also quoted as saying that 
the South Korean government can refuse to recognize or grant South Korean nationality in cases covered 
by article 9 of the Protection Act. KK and ors, [2011] UKUT 92, at para. 35. 
the clause as disallowing entry to individuals who have been outside of North Korea for ten 
years or more at the time of application.35 
 
C. Denial of entry to North Korean escapees present in China 
 
The majority of North Korean escapees live in China, which has a 1,360 km long border 
with North Korea that is relatively easily crossed.  Some of these individuals are content to live 
in the Chinese border region, which has a large ethnic Korean population, despite the 
continuous danger or persecution or deportation back to North Korea.  Many others, however, 
wish to move to South Korea.  This is usually accomplished through clandestinely transiting 
China to get to Vietnam, Thailand, or Mongolia, from where Korean authorities will facilitate 
transport to South Korea.   
The journey, however, is dangerous, and there are many other cases of North Korean 
escapees approaching South Korean officials within China and requesting assistance to enter 
South Korea directly.  This assistance is, according to reports, regularly denied, and escapees 
are not provided the visa or passport that would allow them to board a plane to South Korea.36  
The only two exceptions to this rule have traditionally been particularly high value defectors 
(i.e., those who previously held important positions in the North Korean government), who have 
reportedly been given protection by South Korean authorities, and individuals who have 
successfully stormed a diplomatic compound and demanded asylum.  This latter technique has 
been little-used in recent years because of increased security outside embassies and consulates 
and negative reactions from Chinese authorities.37 
 
                                                          
35 An expert lawyer noted that “it is almost impossible for North Koreans who have been outside North 
Korea for more than ten years and applied abroad to get approved entry into South Korea and acquire 
South Korean citizenship.” KK and ors, [2011] UKUT 92, at para. 55. 
36 Don Kirk, Refugee Aid Groups Say Seoul is Playing Politics, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2001; Lankov, 
supra n. 2, at 58 (“Stories about would-be defectors who went to South Korean embassies or consulates 
but were unconditionally denied assistance are numerous. [citations omitted]  In the South Korean press, 
one can find virtually hundreds of testimonies about this semiofficial stance toward defectors. Indeed, I 
have never seen a single report about a defector whose escape was seriously assisted by the China-based 
South Korean diplomatic staff (unless such a person was a very high-ranking individual)”). 
37 Jamie Miyazaki, ‘Invisible’ N. Korean Refugees all too Visible in China, ASIA TIMES, May 14, 2004. 
D. Denials of entry to individuals outside of China whose eligibility has not been 
investigated under the Protection Act 
 
Finally, there is at least anecdotal evidence of other North Korean escapees outside of 
China being denied entry to South Korea without investigation under the Protection Act, and 
without being told the reason for their rejection.  For example, in a widely reported incident, 
Kim Jong-ryul, who was formerly Kim Il Sung’s personal shopper, asserted that Korean 
Embassy officials had denied him permission to enter South Korea because, he suspected, they 
thought that he was too much of a hard-core communist.38  
More recently, the Upper Tribunal of the United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum 
Chamber investigated this issue, and while it found some evidence suggesting that North 
Koreans are always permitted to enter and reside in South Korea, there was also considerable 
anecdotal evidence to the contrary.39  For example, one solicitor noted that out of fourteen 
clients who had applied for assistance from the South Korean Embassy in London, none had 
received passports or citizenship papers.40  In an expert submission to the Tribunal, Professor 
Christopher Bluth alleged that even in Southeast Asian countries, “the policy of the South 
Korean government remains to discourage refugees and not all ‘North Korean defectors’ will be 
accepted as such.”41  It should be emphasized, however, that these reports of denials are 
anecdotal and isolated. 
 
III. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
 
As one of the three pillars of the international bill of rights, along with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’) and International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights, the ICCPR holds particular importance in the international system.  It was 
ratified by South Korea in 1990 and as of July 6, 2011, has 167 parties.42  The ICCPR protects 
                                                          
38 Kim Se-Jeong, Kim Il-Sung’s Former Crony Denied Asylum, KOR. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010 
39 KK and ors, [2011] UKUT 92, at para. 44 
40 Id.  
41 Id., at 35. 
42 See United Nations Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en. 
South Korea has also ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, so an individual North Korean could 
the right to enter one’s own country in article 12(4), which states that: ''[n]o one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country''.43  This right can only be derogated in 
times of public emergency which threaten the life of the nation and are officially proclaimed.44     
First, it is worth noting that while the terminology of article 12 of the ICCPR is largely 
derived from the UDHR, the texts of the two documents differ in important respects.  The first 
paragraph of article 13 of the UDHR states that “[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, 
including his own, and to return to his country.”45  The second paragraph provides for 
“freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.”46  Thus, article 13 of 
the UDHR can be interpreted as protecting four distinct rights and freedoms, namely 1) a 
freedom of internal movement (i.e., within the borders of a particular state; 2) a freedom of 
residence (again, within the borders of a particular state); a right to leave, or emigrate from, any 
country, and 4) a right to return to one’s country.47  However, by referring to a “right to return” 
rather than a “right to enter”, the plain language of the UDHR would not seem to protect the 
entry rights of an individual who has never been to “his country”.  While the travaux 
préparatoires shed little light on this point, later interpretations have been more expansive, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
challenge a denial of the right of entry in a petition to the Human Rights Committee, although none have 
yet done so.  
43 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12(4), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
44 Id., at art. 4(1). Korea has not proclaimed such a public emergency.   
45 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 13(1) (Dec. 10, 
1948). 
46 Id., at art. 13(2). These rights may be subject “only to such limitations as are determined by law solely 
for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of 
meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.” 
Id., at art. 29. 
47 Atle Grahl-Madsen et al., Article 13, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
COMMON STANDARD OF ACHIEVEMENT 265, 265 (Gudmundur Alfredsson & Asbjørn Eide, eds., 1999).  
Some have inferred a fifth right, namely the right to enter any country, as a corollary of the right to leave.  
However, the existence of such a right has not been generally accepted by States or commentators in 
either the UDHR or subsequent human rights documents. Id., at 276. 
asserting an implied right of entry in the UDHR for nationals to their country of nationality in 
all circumstances.48 
The ICCPR, on the other hand, explicitly embraces a “right to enter” rather than a “right 
to return”.  This clarifies that even individuals who have never set foot in their “own country” 
have a right to enter that country.  As the Human Rights Committee stated in General Comment 
No. 27, the right to enter “includes not only the right to return after having left one's own 
country; it may also entitle a person to come to the country for the first time if he or she was 
born outside the country (for example, if that country is the person's State of nationality).”49  
Thus, even if a North Korean escapee has never set foot in South Korea, he or she would not for 
that reason lack the right to enter.  However, while it is well accepted that Article 12(4) may 
apply to individuals entering their “own country” for the first time, it is still necessary to 
evaluate whether a deprivation is “arbitrary”, what constitutes one’s “own country”, and 
whether article 12(4) applies extraterritorially. 
 
A. Arbitrariness 
 
Commentators have long debated how the Article 12(4) arbitrariness qualifier should be 
interpreted.  The dominant opinion holds that the legislative history of the ICCPR’s drafting 
makes clear that only one type of denial of entry was intended to be considered non-arbitrary, 
namely those rare cases of lawful exile as a punishment for a crime.50  This relatively broad 
conception of arbitrariness has been embraced by the Human Rights Committee, which stated in 
General Comment 27 that “there are few, if any, circumstances in which deprivation of the right 
to enter one's own country could be reasonable”.51  If one accepts this broad characterization of 
                                                          
48 See UN SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, THE 
RIGHT OF EVERYONE TO LEAVE ANY COUNTRY, INCLUDING HIS OWN, AND TO RETURN TO HIS OWN 
COUNTRY, final report prepared by C.L.C. Mubanga-Chipoya, paras. 91, 98, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/35 (June 20, 1988). 
49 HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 27: FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT (ART. 12), para. 
19, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (Nov. 1, 1999).  The Human Rights Committee’s opinions are 
not binding, although they are often considered ‘authoritative’ interpretations of the ICCPR.   
50 Sander Agterhuis, The Right to Return and its Practical Application, 58 REVUE HELLÉNIQUE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL, 165, 172 (2005); MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: 
CCPR COMMENTARY 219 (1st ed., 1993). 
51 HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 27, supra n. 49, at para. 21. 
arbitrariness, then the exclusion of North Korean escapees by the South Korean authorities 
would in all cases be arbitrary, as such exclusions are not the result of lawful exile as 
punishment for a crime. 
Even if one were to embrace a more narrow characterization of arbitrariness than that 
accepted by the Human Rights Committee, there would still be a strong argument that South 
Korean denials of entry that are not pursuant to the Protection Act (including those in China) are 
arbitrary, because they are not undertaken according to valid domestic legal laws and 
regulations.  Denials of entry pursuant to the Protection Act would most likely be considered 
arbitrary as well, because they discriminate against South Korean nationals of North Korean 
origin.  After all, ordinary South Korean nationals are not subject to expulsion upon conviction 
of a crime or denied re-entry after working overseas for ten years.52  
Despite a stated reluctance to accept that denials of entry can be non-arbitrary, the 
Human Rights Committee in fact did rule in the State’s favour in response to one denial of entry, 
in the case of Toala v. New Zealand.53  The case is worth describing in detail, due to certain 
similarities with the Korean situation.  Mr. and Mrs. Toala and Mr. and Mrs. Tofaeono were 
born in Western Samoa between 1932 and 1934.  In July, 1982, while the Toalas and 
Tofaeonos were living in Western Samoa, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that 
under the British Nationality and Status of Aliens (in New Zealand) Act 1928, all persons born 
in Western Samoa between 13 May 1924 and 1 January 1949 are automatically New Zealand 
citizens, along with their descendants.54  Thus, it was undisputed that as of July 1982 the 
Toalas were New Zealand citizens.  However, the Privy Council’s decision was unpopular in 
New Zealand, and, following the negotiation of a Treaty of Friendship between New Zealand 
and Western Samoa, the New Zealand government enacted the Citizenship (Western Samoa) 
                                                          
52 If, however, the terms of the Protection Act were changed to deny entry to individuals who had 
acquired a third (i.e., non-North or South Korean) nationality, this would probably not be found to be 
arbitrary, as South Korean law denationalizes adult citizens who voluntarily acquire a second nationality. 
See, Helen Lee, South Korea: Permanent Dual Nationality Allowed after 60 years, U.S. LAW LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205402187_text 
(noting that despite recent amendments, the Nationality Act “remains unchanged in regard to persons who 
voluntarily become foreign nationals after attaining majority; in such cases there is automatic deprivation 
of their Korean citizenship.”) 
53 Human Rights Comm., Toala v. New Zealand, Communication No. 675/1995, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/70/D/675/1995 (Nov. 22, 2000). 
54 Id., at para. 2.5 (citing Lesa v. The Attorney-General of New Zealand [1983] 2 A.C. 20). 
Act 1982, which effectively nullified the Privy Council’s decision.55  When this new law went 
into effect, in October 1982, the Toalas and Tofaeonos, who were still resident in Western 
Samoa, lost their New Zealand citizenship.   
In 1999, the Toalas and Tofaeonos were residing in New Zealand when they received 
deportation orders.  They then filed a claim to the Human Rights Committee, alleging that 
New Zealand had violated Article 12(4) of the ICCPR by depriving them of citizenship and the 
right to enter New Zealand through passage of the Citizenship (Western Samoa) Act.56  The 
Human Rights Committee found in favor of New Zealand.  It concluded that the Toalas and 
Tofaeonos’ denationalization should not be considered arbitrary because none of them had at 
the time ever applied for a New Zealand passport or claimed to exercise any rights as New 
Zealand citizens, and they lacked ties of birth, descent, residential or other ties with New 
Zealand.57  Essentially, it appears that the Human Rights Committee undertook a type of 
genuine links analysis (as in the well-known Nottebohm Case58 from the International Court of 
Justice) and found that the lack of connections with New Zealand at the time the 
denationalization law meant that denationalization was not arbitrary.   
While the Toala holding suggests the possibility that the refusal of entry to North 
Korean escapees could be legitimate, I do not find it to be a persuasive precedent even if one 
accepts the (very debatable) preliminary point that the denial of entry to a national without 
genuine links to their state of nationality is non-arbitrary.  This is because far greater links 
exist between North Korean escapees and South Korea than did between Western Samoans and 
New Zealand.  Under classical jus sanguinis doctrine North Koreans are descendants of 
citizens of the Republic of Korea, assuming one accepts South Korea as successor to the pre-
division Korean State, and descent has always been accepted as a valid “genuine link”.  Some 
North Koreans may have also fled their country in reliance on the presumed availability of 
sanctuary in South Korea, bringing up interesting questions of estoppel.  In addition, it should 
be emphasized that the Toala case did not address the denial of entry to nationals (as is the case 
                                                          
55 Id., at para. 2.7. 
56 Id., at para. 2.1. 
57 Id., at para. 11.5. 
58 In the Nottebohm case, the International Court of Justice determined that while international law does 
not determine who may be considered a national, other states are not required to recognize a state's 
granting of nationality to a person if there is no genuine link between that person and the nationality-
granting state. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.) (Second Phase), 1955 I.C.J. 5, 11 (Apr. 6). 
with North Korean escapees); rather, it discussed denationalization and the denial of entry to 
denationalized individuals.  At least arguably, it is inherently arbitrary to deny entry to a 
national without prior denationalization, as would be the case with North Korean escapees.59 
 
B. Meaning of “one’s own country” 
 
 The next issue that must be addressed is whether the right to enter one’s “own country” 
encompasses the right of North Korean escapees to enter South Korea.  The question of 
whether one’s “own country” should be interpreted synonymously with “country of nationality” 
dates back to the drafting of the ICCPR.  The ICCPR’s first draft initially referred to the 
individual’s right of entry into ''the country of which he is a national''.60  Thus, the fact that the 
language was changed to one’s “own country” would indicate, according to the principle of 
effectiveness, that a different meaning was intended.  On the other hand, , however, in response 
to requests for clarification by some state delegates to the Third Committee of the UN General 
Assembly, the drafting committee explained that “one’s own country” was meant to denote the 
country of which one was a citizen.61 
 For decades, commentators have debated whether “one’s own country” should be 
interpreted more broadly than a simple reference to country of citizenship, to include resident 
aliens, for example.  The dominant opinion would certainly now favour a broader 
interpretation.62  General Comment 27, for example, explicitly states that the “scope of ‘his 
own country’ is broader than the concept ‘country of his nationality’”.63  This statement has 
been repeated by the Human Rights Committee in Stewart v. Canada.64  However, this general 
conclusion has never been made in the context of nationals with minimal links to their country 
of nationality.   
                                                          
59 Pellonpåå argues that the denial of entry to nationals is inherently arbitrary because the ability to reside 
in one’s home country is integral to the concept of nationality. MATTI PELLONPÅÅ, EXPULSION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 25, 138 (1984). 
60 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NATIONALITY, EXPULSION, STATELESSNESS AND THE RIGHT TO RETURN, 
20 (Sep. 2000), AI Index: ASA 14/01/00. 
61 Id.  
62 Id., at 2. 
63 HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 27, supra n. 49, at para. 20. 
64 Communication No. 538/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/538/1993 (Nov. 1, 1996), para. 12.3.  
The Human Rights Committee addressed the more specific question directly only in 
the Toala case, albeit in dicta, where it suggested that New Zealand may not have qualified as 
the appellants’ “own country” because none of the authors had any connection with New 
Zealand through birth, descent, ties or residence at the time of the Privy Council decision.65  
This suggests that while dual nationals have the right to entry in both countries, some ‘genuine 
links’ must exist before a State can be deemed to be one’s ‘own country’, and at least in certain 
cases formal citizenship may not be sufficient to constitute such a link.66  Rightly or wrongly, 
the Human Rights Committee in Toala seems to have embraced the same analytical framework 
for determining arbitrariness and determining the identity of one’s “own country”. 
 It would be difficult to predict whether or not the Human Rights Committee or another 
tribunal would consider that South Korea qualifies as North Korean escapees’ “own country”.  
If one simply asserts that one’s “own country” is the dominant country in cases of dual 
nationality, then it probably would not: clearly, North Korean escapees have greater connections 
to North Korea than they do to South Korea.  On the other hand, if one uses a genuine links 
analysis, as suggested in Toala, then South Korea is more likely to qualify.  As noted earlier, 
there are real links of descent between North Korean escapees and Korea (as a pre-1945 unified 
sovereign entity).  Other links such as kinship may also be present.  At any rate, to the extent 
that South Korea positions itself constitutionally and otherwise as the inheritor of Korea’s 
sovereignty, it would be hard-pressed to deny being the “own country” of people born in the 
North.  In addition, the mere fact that the escapees are attempting to enter and reside in South 
Korea implies that their allegiance does not lie with the North Korean state (or the regime in 
power there).     
 
C. Extraterritoriality 
 
                                                          
65 Toala v. New Zealand , supra n. 53, at para. 11.5 (“The Committee notes that in 1982 the authors had 
no connection with New Zealand by reason of birth, descent from any New Zealander, ties with New 
Zealand or residence in New Zealand. They were unaware of any claim to New Zealand citizenship at the 
time of the Lesa decision and had acquired New Zealand citizenship involuntarily. It also appears that, 
with the exception of Mr Toala, none of the authors had ever been in New Zealand. All these 
circumstances make it arguable that New Zealand did not become their "own country" by virtue of the 
Lesa decision.”) 
66 SARAH JOSEPH, JENNYSCHULTZ & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS & COMMENTARY 376 (2d. ed. 2004).   
To the extent that South Korean officials are denying entry to North Korean escapees, 
such denials are taking place in embassies and consulates outside of the country – there is no 
real evidence of North Koreans actually being turned away once they have arrived in South 
Korea.67  Thus, it is necessary to look at whether the ICCPR applies extraterritorially to the 
actions of South Korean officials.   
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR places an obligation upon state parties to respect and to 
ensure rights “to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction”.68  This 
clause has been consistently and repeatedly interpreted by the Human Rights Committee 
disjunctively, to mean that states are liable within their borders as well as for the actions of their 
agents when those actions take place overseas.69  Thus, in General Comment 31, the 
Committee stated that the ICCPR applies to all individuals “who may find themselves in the 
territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party.” (italics added).70  The International 
Court of Justice also held that the ICCPR applies extraterritorially in its Advisory Opinion on 
the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.71  
This conclusion has been echoed by many commentators.72 
                                                          
67 There were suspicions that North Korean escapees had been returned against their will after one 2008 
incident where 22 North Koreans were repatriated (and later reportedly executed) upon arriving in South 
Korean waters in a fishing boat.  However, these allegations were refuted by South Korean government 
sources who asserted that the North Koreans had accidentally drifted across the border and did not wish to 
defect.  22 N. Korean Drifters Executed after Returning Home: Source, YONHAP NEWS, at Feb. 17, 2008, 
at 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2008/02/17/95/0301000000AEN20080217001500315F.HTML.  
68 ICCPR, supra n. 43, art. 2(1). 
69 As the Human Rights Committee stated in Burgos/Lopez v. Uruguay, “it would be unconscionable to 
so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate 
violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its 
own territory.” Burgos/Delia Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay, Communication No. 52/1979, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/OP/1, para. 88 (July 29, 1981).  See also, Casariego v. Uruguay, Communication No. 56/1979, 
U.N. Doc. CPR/C/13/D/56/ 1979, paras. 10.1–10.3 (July 29, 1981),  
70 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, para. 10, U.N. Doc. CCRR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 
2004). 
71 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2004) ICJ 
The extraterritorial scope of the ICCPR is not universally accepted, however.  The 
United States in particular has long held that the ICCPR is not applicable extraterritorially.73  
The U.S. position is based on the plain language of the treaty – the use of “and” instead of “or” 
in article 2(1) – as well as an examination of the travaux préparatoires, which, the U.S. claims, 
demonstrate that an extraterritorial scope for the ICCPR was the subject of considerable debate 
before being explicitly rejected.74   
 This essay will not attempt an in depth analysis of the relative merits of the U.S. 
position versus the position taken by the Human Rights Committee, ICJ, and most 
commentators.  However, as a practical matter, it is clear that the majority of international law 
experts, states, and institutions accept the extraterritorial scope of the ICCPR, especially in the 
context of overseas treatment of one’s own citizens.75  If a North Korean escapee ever brought 
an article 12(4) case before the Human Rights Committee, there is little to no chance that the 
case would be lost on extraterritoriality grounds, and indeed South Korea would be very 
unlikely to argue the point. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Gen. List No. 131, decided July 9, 2004, at para. 111.(‘‘the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights is applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own 
territory’’) 
72 See, e.g., Theodor Meron, Agora: The 1994 U.S. Action in Haiti: Extraterritoriality of Human Rights 
Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L 78, 79 (1995); Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State 
Obligations and Permissible Delegations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON 
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 72, 74 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981); Martin Scheinin, Extraterritorial Effect of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS TREATIES, 73 (Fons Coomans & Menno Kamminga, eds., 2004). 
73 Matthew Waxman, Head of U.S. Delegation, Principal Deputy Director of Policy Planning, Dep’t of 
State, Opening Statement at ICCPR Presentation (July 17, 2006) (“It is the long-standing view of my 
government that applying the basic rules for the interpretation of treaties described in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties leads to the conclusion that the language in Article 2, Pargraph 1, 
establishes that States Parties are required to respect and ensure the rights in the Covenant only to 
individuals who are BOTH within the territory of a State Party and subject to its jurisdiction.”) 
74 Patrick Walsh, Fighting for Human Rights: The Application of Human Rights Treaties to United 
States’ Military Operations, 28 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 45, 51 (2009). 
75 Hugh King, The Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations of States, 9:4 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 521, 523 
(2009). 
 D. Conclusion 
 
As the preceding analysis indicates, the question of whether art. 12(4) of the ICCPR 
would prohibit South Korea from denying entry to North Korean escapees would largely depend 
on how the term “arbitrary” is interpreted, whether South Korea would be considered to be 
the ”own country” of North Korean escapees, and whether art. 12(4) is considered effective 
extraterritorially.  Given the broad interpretation of arbitrariness that has been accepted by the 
Human Rights Committee, it seems unlikely that such denials would be considered arbitrary, as 
they are not the result of lawful exile.  While the Toala Case brings up the possibility that 
denial of entry to an individual who lacks genuine links to his or her country of nationality 
would be non-arbitrary, it is likely that North Korean escapees would be found to have genuine 
links (of descent) with the South Korean state. 
It is harder to predict whether the Human Rights Committee or another tribunal would 
consider South Korea to be the “own country” of North Korean escapees.  The Toala case 
indicates that a genuine links test might be used to determine one’s “own country” as well as 
arbitrariness.  If this is the case, then South Korea would likely qualify as the escapees’ own 
country.  In any event, the South Korean government might be loath to argue that it is not the 
North Koreans’ “own country”, considering its long-standing constitutional insistence that it is 
the true representative of a Korean state encompassing the entire Korean peninsula.  Similarly, 
the Korean government might be reluctant to assert that the ICCPR is not effective 
extraterritorially, because that position, while certainly not frivolous, has been roundly rejected 
by the Human Rights Committee and the vast majority of commentators and states.  Thus, it is 
likely that the Human Rights Committee or other tribunal would in fact find that South Korea’s 
denial of entry to North Korean escapees to be a violation of its ICCPR commitments. 
 
IV. Customary International Law 
 
 A country’s possible duty to accept its own nationals under customary international 
law can be conceived of in one of two ways.  First, there may be a duty owed to other states 
under classical customary international law.76  Second, there is a possible duty owed to the 
                                                          
76 This duty is owed not simply to the expelling state or state from where entry is sought, but also to other 
states whose territories the individual would be forced to enter if entry was not permitted. Pellonpåå, 
supra n. 59, at 26 (1984). 
individual being denied entry, that could potentially exist under customary international human 
rights law.  Oftentimes, these two potential duties are not adequately differentiated in the legal 
literature and there is sparse case law relating to the responsibility to accept one’s own citizens 
under customary international law.   
 
A. Duty owed to States 
 
 For many years, there has been considerable disagreement among international lawyers 
as to whether a customary international law duty existed for states to allow entry to their 
nationals.  Analyses by Clemens Huffman77 and Yoram Dinstein78 found there to be no such 
general duty under customary international law.  The more widely accepted conclusion, 
however, is that a duty to accept nationals does indeed exist.  This duty was regularly 
pronounced by commentators as far back as the nineteenth century79 and more recently has 
been generally accepted by the major experts in nationality law.80  In addition, a United 
Nations survey of international instruments and national laws from 1987 concluded that the 
right to leave and return is "a legal obligation according to customary international law."81  The 
                                                          
77 Clemens Hufmann, Duty to Receive Nationals?, 24 FORDHAM L. REV. 235, 263 (1955) (“general 
international law does not obligate States to receive back their nationals from other countries … the 
development of such an obligation is not desirable.”) 
78 Yoram Dinstein, The Israeli Supreme Court and the Law of Belligerent Occupation: Deportations, 23 
ISRAELI YEARBOOK ON HUM. RTS. 1, 8-9 (1993). 
79 See, Siegfried Wiessner, Blessed be the Ties that Bind: The Nexus Between Nationality and Territory, 
56 MISS L.J. 447, 483 (1988). 
80 See, e.g., GUY GOODWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN 
STATES, 137 (1978); Kay Hailbronner, Nationality in Public International Law and European Law, in 
ACQUISITION AND LOSS OF NATIONALITY VOLUME I: COMPARATIVE ANALYSES 35, 78 (Rainer Bauböck 
et al., eds. 2006) (“Although there have often been difficulties and barriers to enforcing such duties, state 
practice supports the assumption of a duty of states under public international law to readmit their own 
nationals.”) 
81 C. MUBANGA-CHIPOYA, ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING THE 
RIGHT TO LEAVE ANY COUNTRY INCLUDING ONE'S OWN, AND TO RETURN TO ONE'S OWN COUNTRY, AND 
SOME OTHER RIGHTS OR CONSIDERATION ARISING THEREFROM 11, U.N. ESCOR, 39th Sess., Agenda 
Item 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/10 (1987). 
principle has been accepted by courts as well, most prominently in the European Court of 
Justice’s opinion in Van Duyn v. Home Office, which stated that as “a principle of international 
law … a State is precluded from refusing to its own nationals the right of entry or residence”.82   
 While it seems fair to conclude that a general customary international law rule exists 
that states must allow entry to nationals, it has been argued that there is an exception to that rule, 
which is pertinent to the situation of North Korean escapees; namely, that dual nationals have 
no right of entry under customary international law.  After all, the reason for the international 
legal requirement to accept nationals is to avoid creating stateless individuals who will come to 
burden other countries, and, to the extent that a second state of nationality exists, such concerns 
do not arise. 
 Certainly, if one looks at state practice, there are many examples of countries that have 
denationalized and then expelled dual nationals, as surveyed by William Worster.83  There are 
fewer cases of states refusing entry to or expelling dual nationals that have not been 
denationalized, but some examples exist, most significantly involving the United Kingdom.84  
Most recently, the U.K. developed a much-criticized domestic law category of “British 
Nationals (Overseas)”, which applied to U.K. nationals from Hong Kong without the right to 
reside in the European territory of the U.K.85  Similar categories such as “British Subjects 
without Citizenship” and “British Protected Persons” had previously been employed to 
categorize other colonial subjects without the right to live in Britain, most notably applying to 
many Asians resident in East Africa.86  In defending this policy, U.K. leaders expressed their 
understanding that international law requires that admission be granted to nationals only in 
                                                          
82 1 CMLR (1975) 18 (E.C.J. 1975). 
83 William Worster, International Law and the Expulsion of Individuals with More than One Nationality, 
14 UCLA J. INT‘L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 423 450-51 (2009) 450-451 (listing examples from nineteen 
countries). 
84 Other examples given include cases from Mexico and Turkmenistan. Id., at 497-98.  
85 Id., at 496-97.  
86 Weis, supra n. 9 at 51-3. See, also, Mark McElreath, Degrading Treatment - From East Africa to Hong 
Kong: British Violations of Human Rights; 22 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 331 (1990-1991); Randall 
Hansen, The Kenyan Asians, British Politics, and the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1968, 42(3) THE 
HISTORICAL JOURNAL 809 (1999). 
those cases where they have nowhere else to go.87  The majority opinion, therefore, is that dual 
nationals have no customary international law protection against expulsion or denial of entry,88 
or alternately that such protection exists only exists vis à vis the country of dominant 
nationality.89 
 If one accepts this limitation on the right of entry, then there would be no customary 
international law duty owed by South Korea to other states to accept North Korean escapees.  
North Korean escapees are all (at least) dual nationals, as they possess both North and South 
Korean nationality.  To the extent that one of the two states has a legal obligation to allow 
entry, that duty would fall to North Korea, as the state of dominant nationality (given that most 
of the escapees would have never even set foot in South Korea). 
 
B. Duty owed to Individuals 
 
 It is notoriously difficult to identify those norms that have attained the status of 
customary international human rights law.  The Restatement of Foreign Relations, which is 
often cited by U.S. lawyers, provides a relatively narrow list, asserting that a country violates 
international law if:  
 
as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones (a) genocide, 
(b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the murder or causing the disappearance of 
individuals, (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f) systematic racial 
                                                          
87 Frank Wooldridge & Vishnu Sharma, International Law and the Expulsion of Ugandan Asians, 9(1) 
INT’L LAWYER 30, 42(citing Sir Alec Douglas-Home (then Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Relations) statement that “under international law, a state has a duty to accept those of its 
nationals who have nowhere else to go.”) 
88 Worster, supra n. 83 at 498 (“we must regard dual nationality as a valid, non-arbitrary exception to a 
general practice of the right to residence, if so provided under municipal law). 
89 Int'l Law Comm'n, Fourth report on the expulsion of aliens by Maurice Kamto, Special Rapporteur, 
para. 17, U.N. Doc. A/ CN.4/594 (Mar. 24, 2008). (arguing that in cases of dual nationality, the country 
of dominant nationality may not expel a national without agreement from another country to admit that 
person, but the other state of nationality is under no such prohibition). 
discrimination, or (g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally 
recognized human rights.90   
 
Others have asserted that a much broader spectrum of rights should be considered as customary 
international law, claiming that those rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights have – at least in part – evolved into customary international law.91  Even if one accepts 
this thesis, though, it would not provide for a customary right to enter one’s country of 
nationality for the first time, and thus would not by its plain terms apply to the vast majority of 
North Korean escapees.92 
 It has also been claimed that the origin of customary international human rights law 
lies in the expanding web of multilateral treaties that have been widely accepted in the field.93  
If one accepts this premise, one can find some evidence that a new norm is emerging to protect 
the right to enter one’s country of nationality.  Article 3(2) of Protocol 4 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights states that “No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the 
territory of the state of which he is a national.”94  Article 22(5) of the American Convention on 
Human Rights provides that “No one can be expelled from the territory of the state of which he 
is a national or be deprived of the right to enter it”.95  In the realm of soft law, it is worth 
noting the Strasbourg Declaration on the Right to Leave and Return adopted by the International 
Institute of Human Rights, which states that “no one shall be deprived of the right to enter his or 
                                                          
90 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 702 (1987). 
91 See, e.g., Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and 
International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 290 (1995-96) ;PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S 
MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 213 (7th ed. 1997). 
92 Article 13(2) of the UDHR states that ''Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, 
and to return to his country''. UDHR, supra n. 45, at art. 13(2). 
93 Anthony D'Amato, Human Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A Plea for Change of 
Paradigms, 25 GEORGIA J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. 47, 98 (1995-96) (“the only logically satisfying and 
empirically validating position to take on the source of human rights norms is that they derive from 
provisions in treaties”). 
94 Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
3(2), Europ. T.S. No. 46 (entered into force May 2, 1968). 
95 Organization of American States: American Convention on Human Rights, art. 22(5), Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
her own country”,96 a somewhat broader formulation than found in the ICCPR, as it does not 
contain an arbitrariness requirement. 
Nevertheless, other human rights systems fail to provide a right of entry.  Article 
12(2) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights echoes the narrower “right of 
return” language of the UDHR, stating that “Every individual shall have the right to leave any 
country including his own, and to return to his country.”97  The Arab Charter on Human Rights 
likewise protects the right to return rather than the right to enter,98 as does the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.99   Given the disparate language, it 
would be very difficult to claim that the right of entry to one’s country of nationality has yet 
attained the status of customary international human rights law. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 As this essay demonstrates, while there is currently no customary international law 
duty for South Korea to accept North Korean escapees, such a duty does exist under the ICCPR.  
There are also real-world adverse consequences to a policy that claims North Koreans as South 
Korean nationals but then does not always permit them to enter and reside in South Korea.  
Most notably, third countries may choose to deny asylum to North Korean escapees on the 
grounds that they are South Korean nationals: some have already done so.100   
                                                          
96 Strasbourg Declaration on the Right to Leave and Return, art. 6(a), adopted by a meeting of experts, 
Strasbourg, France, Nov. 26, 1986, reprinted in Hurst Hannum, The Right to Leave and to Return in 
International Law and Practice, 81 AM. J. INT'L. L. 432, 436 (1987). 
97 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 12(2), June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, 21 I.L.M. 
58. 
98 League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, Art. 27(2), May 22, 2004, reprinted in 12 INT'L 
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Australia. See, e.g., Australia Refugee Review Tribunal decisions 0909449 [2010] RRTA 763 [Australia] 
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There are three ways that South Korea could resolve this dilemma and come into 
compliance with its ICCPR obligations, none of which would be easy paths.  The first option 
would be for the government to change its policy so as to accept all North Korean escapees.  
This would be a tremendously difficult change to effectuate and would lead to serious 
international tensions, considering the strong Chinese opposition to facilitating emigration of 
North Koreans to South Korea.  There would also be deep fears that in the event of political 
instability, South Korea would be flooded with North Korean escapees before putting into place 
a process to integrate them into the society in an orderly fashion. 
Thus, if South Korea does intend to continue treating entry and residence as a 
discretionary privilege for North Korean escapees, rather than a right, there would be two 
possible legislative reforms that would bring it into compliance with the ICCPR.  First, the 
Nationality Act could be reformed to clarify that North Korean escapees are not born South 
Korean nationals, but must instead apply for nationality (analogously to how non-Israeli Jews 
must apply for Israeli citizenship, which they are entitled to under the Israeli Law of Return).  
This would be a controversial measure, as it would be seen as a step away from treating North 
Koreans and South Koreans as equals in the eyes of the law, which would perhaps not bode well 
for equal rights and equal treatment for North Koreans in the (widely anticipated) eventuality of 
a North Korean regime collapses and peninsular reunification.   
The other option would be to amend the constitution, so as to clarify that the territorial 
boundaries of South Korea are limited to the area that it actually administers, rather than the 
entire peninsula.  Constitutional amendment in Korea is not a simple process, however, 
requiring approval by two thirds of the members of the National Assembly as well as a majority 
of voters in a referendum attracting a turnout of at least half of eligible voters.101  Evidently, an 
amendment would be extraordinarily controversial, as it would be seen by some as a sign of 
weakness or a sign that the government is giving up on unification.  On the other hand, it could 
                                                                                                                                                                          
2010).  Prior to 2004, asylum denials based on dual nationality status also were handed down in the 
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101 Constitution of the Republic of Korea, supra n. 13, at arts. 128-130. 
be seen by others as a gracious confidence-building measure towards the North.102  Such an 
amendment would automatically result in the Nationality Act ceasing to apply to North Koreans, 
allowing for a new naturalization process to be developed, most likely based on the criteria set 
out in the Protection Act.   
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